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European securitised investments are ‘risky’ and ‘illiquid’, a stigma perpetuated by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Head of Secured Credit Colin Fleury unravels these myths by examining actual historical evidence – both over the short and long term.
The structural protections embedded within European securitised investments can offer valuable buffers against losses. In the event of underlying loan portfolio defaults, the equity component of a securitised structure provides protection to the bonds, with losses only realised by the debt tranches in order of priority (AAA last) once the equity has been fully written off.
This form of credit enhancement, called ‘tranching’, also creates a waterfall structure, where cashflows are allocated to the higher-rated tranches first and work their way down to the lower-rated tranches. To compensate for the extra risk, investors in the junior-ranked tranches receive a better yield than those higher up the capital structure. Tranching also provides investors with the flexibility to tailor portfolios to specific risk-return objectives, as it determines the specific repayment and credit profiles for a particular bond in the structure.
Other forms of credit enhancement to improve the credit quality of securitised debt include the following:
The amount and form of credit support differs by tranche rating and instrument type. Residential mortgage-backed securities (or RMBS) tend to use excess spread and subordination, whereas for commercial mortgage-backed securities (or CMBS), over-collateralisation and reserves are common. A securitisation transaction also naturally de-levers over time, as investments can be fully or partially amortising. This means that immediately or after a specific period, repayments from the underlying collateral portfolio are used to repay principal. The impact of this is less borrower refinancing risk for investors, compared to say a corporate bond, which typically have a large principal payment at maturity.
One way to bring to life the impact of such protections is to consider the credit support available against the worst losses seen in the asset class. For a AAA CLO, for example, the typical credit support is 40% – until cumulative collateral losses exceed 40%, the AAA notes do not take a capital loss. This is two and a half times greater than the worst collateral losses seen in the asset class (Figure 1). In fact, no European AAA, AA and A-rated CLO tranche has ever defaulted[1].
Source: Janus Henderson Investors, Moody’s, selected individual transactions from investor presentations, as at 31 December 2023.
Note: *Worst historically observed losses: CLOs – based on worst 6-year cumulative defaults for the period between 2007 – 2020, based on Moody’s speculative grade default data and recovery rate of 60%. Prime and non-conforming RMBS – based on cumulative losses for the period 2007 – 2019. Prime auto ABS – based on Moody’s 5-year cumulative loss data on deals up to 2013, Near prime auto – based on selected individual transactions worst vintage cumulative defaults and 40% recovery rate. Janus Henderson estimates for illustrative purposes only. Typical Credit Support includes some assumed portion of excess interest earned by the underlying collateral. Each transaction will be different and the above are Janus Henderson’s ABS team views and should not be construed as advice. Past performance does not predict future returns.
Another way to assess the ‘riskiness’ of investments is to consider how easy it is to sell out of them when you need to alongside the price that investors have to pay. As an active investor in the securitisation markets for over 15 years, experience tells us that liquidity is far better than many might perceive. During the market volatility induced by the Covid pandemic and the UK Liability-driven investment (LDI) crisis in 2022, liquidity held up relatively well in the European securitised sector. With the issues driven by rising rates, pension schemes often looked first to sell down floating rate assets, such as securitised, to avoid crystallising larger capital losses in fixed rate bonds. While the LDI-related turmoil resulted in a spike in trading volumes in European securitised, this was absorbed by a range of investors. The subsequent dislocation in European securitised prices saw the likes of bank treasuries and even private equity firms step in to pick up what remained fundamentally high-quality assets, but at attractive discounts. Around €13 billion of European securitisations were sold over four weeks from the end of September and volumes absorbed well[2].
This highlights the ability of the securitised market to absorb significant supply (over a very short space of time) and provide liquidity to investors when they need it most. This is reflected in the publicly reported trading volume in the market, typically measured using “Bids Wanted in Competition” (BWIC or auction processes run by end investors to sell bonds), with volumes providing a good indication of secondary market trading activity (and liquidity), as shown in Figure 2. The costs of liquidity – the difference between the bid and offer price of a bond – unsurprisingly tend to spike during periods of extreme trading levels, but these were generally not excessive when we look at the second half of 2022 and quickly normalised. This can be seen in Figure 3 below which focuses on European AAA CLOs.
Source: Janus Henderson Investors, Deutsche Bank as at 30 August 2024.
Source: Janus Henderson Investors, JP Morgan, as at March 2023. There is no guarantee past trends will continue.
So rather than being ‘risky’ and’ ‘illiquid’, even in times of market stress, securitised assets have proved to be resilient in terms of liquidity and returns. This is even more apparent when considering long-term returns against volatility delivered by the European securitised sector. Here we consider the three truths around the European securitised sector:
Source: Janus Henderson Investors, Bloomberg. Euro Corporate Bond index: ICE BofA Euro Corporate Index. Sterling Corporate Bond Index: ICE BofA Sterling Corporate Bond index as at 31 December 2024.
Note: Data shown for the JHI European securitised Rep account is referencing Janus Henderson Asset Backed Securities Fund.
1 Credit spreads are versus SONIA for the ABS Fund. Bond index credit spreads are Swap OAS.
2 Yield shown for the Janus Henderson ABS Fund and corporate bond indices are calculated by summing credit spread and swap rate corresponding to weighted average life.
3 Spread duration is based on modelled base expected average life for the invested portfolio of the ABS Fund.
4 Reset dates used for floating rate investments in calculations for the invested portfolio.
5 Excludes cash balance.
Yields may vary and are not guaranteed.
Source: Janus Henderson Investors, as at 31 December 2024. European securitised Representative account: Janus Henderson Asset-Backed Securities Fund Gross of fees in GBP. Index: SONIA (Sterling Overnight Index Average). Index usage: Target. Bloomberg Pan European FRN ABS Bond Index, ICE BofA corporate bond and US ABS indices, Credit Suisse leveraged loan indices,
*The data shown is of the Asset Backed Securities portfolio sleeve of the Janus Henderson Horizon Total Return Bond Fund up to September 2020 and Janus Henderson Asset-Backed Securities Fund thereafter, to demonstrate the ABS team’s performance track record and is for illustrative purposes only. The fund managers have been running this portfolio sleeve since March 2012. Note that any differences among portfolio securities currencies, share class currencies and costs to be paid or represented in currencies other than your home currency will expose you to currency risk. Costs and returns may increase or decrease as a result of currency and exchange rate fluctuations.
Notes: Returns are hedged to GBP, gross of fees. Volatility is based on standard deviation. Since Inception date: 31 March 2012. Sharpe Ratios are calculated by dividing Excess Returns by Volatility. Please see end of presentation for index descriptions. Index returns are hedged to GBP. For a full list of index descriptions please see the last slide of the presentation.
Past performance does not predict future returns.
Source: Bloomberg, Janus Henderson Investors Analysis, as at 30 September 2024.
Note: European securitised represents the Janus Henderson Asset-Backed Securities Fund Z inc GBP Hedged, gross of fees from October 2020 given the fund’s inception date: 15 September 2020. Prior to this, performance track record for our ABS strategy reflects the ABS sleeve of the Janus Henderson Horizon Total Return Bond Fund.
Indices: ICE BofA Euro Corporate Bond Index; FTSE UK Gilts Over 15 Years Index; FTSE UK Gilts Index-Linked Over 5 Years Index; J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Diversified Index; ICE BofA Global High Yield Constrained Index; MSCI All Countries World Index
Past performance does not predict future returns.
Source: Bloomberg, Citi, ICE indices, as a 31 December 2024. IG: ICE BofA Euro Corporate Index. For CLO, total yield is calculated as credit spread plus the swap rate corresponding to average life. This is the 4-year Euro SWAP rate. For IG, yield-to-worst is presented. For volatility, 3-year total return volatility for CLO is estimated using AAA CLO spread moves, assumed carry and cash returns. Cash returns are estimated using 1m Euribor. Yields may vary and are not guaranteed.
In summary, the perception of European securitised investments as inherently ‘risky’ and ‘illiquid’ is a myth not supported by historical evidence. Structural safeguards in securitisations significantly mitigate risk and enhance credit quality, debunking concerns about their safety. Furthermore, the resilience of these assets during market upheavals demonstrates their liquidity and capacity to normalise and offer compelling risk-adjusted returns over the long term. This robust performance, coupled with benefits like higher credit quality, lower interest rate risk, and portfolio diversification, shows the unfounded nature of the myths surrounding securitised assets and highlights their value as a strategic component of diversified fixed income portfolios.
[1] Source: Moody’s Investors Services, Janus Henderson Investors. Please note defaults and losses are for overall market, CLO transactions due to restrictive eligibility criteria typically experience lower default rates, 2023.
[2] Source: Janus Henderson Investors estimates and BWIC volumes between 30 September 2022 and 21 October 2022.